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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**

7 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

8 LAURA LEIGH,

9 Plaintiff,

10 **Case No. 3:10-cv-00597-LRH-VPC**

11 vs.

12 KEN SALAZAR, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, BOB ABBEY, in his official
13 capacity as Director of the BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT; RON WENKER in his
14 official capacity as Nevada State Director of
the BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, et
15 al.,

Defendants.

16 /

17 **REPLY (to Doc 20) IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (Filed October 1, 2010)(Doc 15)**

18 Plaintiff submits the following Reply to Defendants' Opposition (Doc 20) to her
19 Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc 15) filed October 1, 2010.

20 This Motion challenges directly, the Defendants impermissible, unconstitutional
21 prior restraints on Plaintiff's First Amendment rights through the Defendants course and
22 conduct, when precluding Plaintiff, a journalist and wild horse advocate, from
23 reasonable access to wild horse roundups and related activities, to observe and report
24 the Defendants activities stemming from the Defendants' capture, removal, processing,
25 shipping, transportation, housing and ultimate disposition of wild horses taken during
26 the Silver King wild horse round operations.
27
28

1 I.
2 **MUCH OF DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IS NOT GERMANE, DOES NOT ADDRESS**
3 **MATTERS IN ISSUE AND IS IRRELEVANT, AS ARE SUPPORTING DECLARATIONS**

4 The first five pages of the Defendants' Opposition is completely irrelevant to the
5 relief sought or to the discussion at hand.

6 This case since its inception is currently, and has always involved, First
7 Amendment notions. The Defendants' characterization or implication that the Amended
8 TRO Motion seeks *anew*, relief under the First Amendment [Opposition (Doc 20),
9 p.(sic) 1, l. 11-13], is sheer folly. Relief against the Defendants' illegal First Amendment
10 prior restraints has been the essential, sole relief sought since inception.

11 No portion of Plaintiff's requested relief is based on the ongoing "inhumane"
12 issues involved in the Defendants' wild horse management. No part of the Motion
13 challenges the Defendants' ability to roundup excess horses. Accordingly, all
14 discussion in the Defendants' Opposition which addresses, *ad nauseam*, these
15 irrelevant matters, [the "Introduction" at p. (sic) 1, the "Statutory Background" at pp.
16 (sic) 1-4 and the "Factual Background at pp. (sic) 4-5] is irrelevant, does not address
17 matters raised in Plaintiff's brief, does not speak to matters "in issue," and should be
18 stricken as superfluous.

19 Similarly, the Declaration of Mary D'Aversa (Doc 20-4) discusses matters *not* in
20 issue. Ms. D'Aversa was never at Silver King. She discusses *no* "public observation"
21 issues. She discusses no "press" or "access" issues. Inasmuch as Ms. D'Aversa's
22 Declaration is non-responsive to any matter "in issue," Plaintiff respectfully requests it
23 should be stricken as irrelevant.

24 Also, most all of the Declaration of Alan Shepard fails to address issues raised in
25 Plaintiff's Amended TRO Motion. His position with the BLM, his experience, his
26 statements that the "BLM has the authority" to do whatever it likes, including close
27 public lands [in contravention of a prior ruling by this court in case 3:10-cv-417, (Doc 18
28 entered July 16, 2010)], etc., are all irrelevant to the issue at hand. His personal
opinions or ideas of what's "reasonable" in terms of restricting distance and time, are

1 likewise irrelevant. There has been no establishment as to his qualifications of
2 determining how he considers himself an expert witness on the issue germane to this
3 case, which is this: public access to wild horse roundups and reasonable public access.

4 Moreover, Alan Shepard was never at the Silver King roundup at any of the
5 times the Plaintiff was at Silver King when attempting to glimpse a view of the
6 Defendants' roundup activities. Accordingly, Alan Shepard has no personal, first-hand
7 experience of how the Plaintiff was precluded from viewing the BLM's activities. None.

8 About the only statement that is germane is Mr. Shepard's statement at
9 paragraph 39 of his Declaration. Even this statement however, contains unsupported
10 conclusions. Shepard fails to define what the term, "reasonable" references. Shepard
11 fails to define a "safe distance." Rather, Shepard uses such terms to conclude, without
12 basis in specific facts, that the BLM needs "safety protocols" and "reasonable
13 restrictions." Neither he nor any other government witness define these concepts.
14 Accordingly, Mr. Shepard's unsupported, vague ideas or notions, without specific
15 bases, should be disregarded.

16 Plaintiff respectfully requests Alan Shepard's Declaration should be stricken in its
17 entirety as irrelevant, or unsupported, or as lacking in foundation for unsubstantiated
18 opinion testimony, or for all of these reasons.

19 **II.**
20 **THOSE AMONG DEFENDANTS WHO HAVE ACTUAL, FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE**
21 **OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ACCESS TO SILVER KING, HAVE NOT PROVIDED THEIR**
22 **DECLARATION (EXCEPT H. EMMONS WHO HAS MINIMAL INFORMATION)**

23 The person from among the Defendants' employees having true first-hand,
24 personal knowledge of Ms. Leigh's access (or lack thereof) to the Silver King roundup
25 activities, is **Mr. Chris Hanefeld**. Mr. Hanefeld is the BLM's "Ely District Public Affairs
26 Specialist." Mr. Hanefeld was present *every day* Ms. Leigh was present. Ms. Leigh
27 was present five days during the Silver King roundup. Hanefeld was with or around her
28 each of those five days. Mr. Hanefeld is familiar with the whereabouts of Ms. Leigh
while on public lands at Silver King. Mr. Hanefeld is familiar with Ms. Leigh's ability or

1 non-ability to view the Silver King roundup activities. Mr. Hanefeld is familiar with Ms.
2 Leigh's purported "access" to Silver King roundup activities.

3 Mr. Hanefeld is the person most knowledgeable among the Defendants,
4 concerning Ms. Leigh's access or lack thereof at Silver King. Mr. Hanefeld is the
5 person most knowledgeable concerning Ms. Leigh's and others' treatment by the
6 Defendants' chosen contractor performing roundup activities. Mr. Hanefeld is the
7 person most knowledgeable concerning Ms. Leigh's presence, her demeanor, her
8 cooperativeness, during her time there at Silver King. Mr. Hanefeld is the person most
9 knowledgeable concerning Ms. Leigh's ability to view wild horse gather activities at
10 Silver King.

11 The compelling question in the aftermath of the litany of government employee
12 Declarations who have no first-hand knowledge of the access restrictions imposed on
13 Ms. Leigh, or who were never there, is this: **WHERE IS MR. HANEFELD? WHERE IS**
14 **HIS TESTIMONY?** Why is he not providing a Declaration? Why is he not being asked
15 to help offer the truth of what's transpiring in Silver King, to the court?

16 **III.**
17 **THE DEFENDANTS' RELIANCE ON THE COURT'S ORDER AS THE BASIS**
18 **FOR DENIAL OF THE AMENDED TRO MOTION IS MISPLACED**

19 The Defendants' attempted hitchhiking on the back of a ruling that is not based
20 on facts presented in the original motion, is not productive.

21 The court clearly had another case in mind when it denied the original TRO
22 Motion. The record demonstrates the court inadvertently believed the original TRO
23 Motion in this case, sought relief based on "inhumane" treatment issues. Such is not
24 the case. Although the BLM engages in inhumane wild horse gathers, Silver King
25 included, no relief has been sought in this case for that purpose (i.e. no relief is sought
26 based on the inhumane treatment of wild horses). Rehashing the issue again, to point
27 out what the case is *not* about, is not fruitful. This issue was thoroughly addressed to the
28 court in the Amended TRO Motion [(Doc 15), pp. 2-5]. See *and compare* Order (Doc
13).

1 **IV.**
2 **THE GOVERNMENT’S CONTENTION – BLM PUBLIC LANDS WHERE WILD**
3 **HORSES ROAM, ARE NOW “NON-PUBLIC FORUMS” – IS AN INCREDIBLE**
4 **“FIRST NOTICE” THAT OFFENDS THE SENSES**

5 The Defendants most pronounced argument to preclude the press, the public
6 and Ms. Leigh from having true, reasonable access to observe the Defendants’
7 roundups of wild horses on public lands involves their latest, incredible revelation that
8 “herd management areas” (and perhaps other areas of public lands at their unilateral
9 choosing in the future) can and, in this instance, are considered (by the government
10 Defendants) “non-public forums.”

11 This newest revelation of course, is the latest purported justification for limiting,
12 restricting, precluding and censoring the content of speech, and in precluding journalists
13 including Ms. Leigh, from having true, reasonable access to observe and then report to
14 the public, the Defendants’ roundup and related activities. If the Defendants were in
15 fact, providing “reasonable” access all along, they would not be offering this newest
16 twist.

17 This newly raised contention in truth, is the Department of Interior’s and BLM’s
18 new pronouncement which conveys to the public that they (the public) have no right to
19 know or be advised from independent sources, how the government manages a public
20 resource (wild horses on HMAs in this instance) on public lands.

21 Nowhere in known “notices” from the Defendants, is there any statement that
22 makes this newly formed, self-declared limitation or designation, that public lands are
23 now *non-public* forums. To the contrary, all of the Defendants’ literature, notices,
24 website links refer to the BLM managed lands as the “National System of Public
25 Lands.” There are no signs or postings indicating otherwise, found on the Silver King
26 BLM borders or elsewhere, that citizens are entering a special-type enclave where
27 speech, the press and expression are limited. Unless inadvertently missed, no such
28 notice is found in the Federal Register. No official explanation to the public is posted
anywhere as to the ramifications of claiming that public lands are really, “non-public
forums.” The words “non-public forum” are offered for the first time in the Defendants

1 Opposition (Doc 20) to Plaintiff's TRO Motion. This is their first notice to the public.

2 See and compare, *United States v. Grace*, 461 U.S. 171, 180, 103 S.Ct. 1702
3 (1983) (expressing concern regarding allegedly nonpublic forums that provide "no
4 separation ... and no indication whatever to persons ... that they have entered some
5 special type of enclave."); *Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles*, 994 F.2d 570, 576 (9th
6 Cir.1993) (noting that area at issue "is still part of the park and it is indistinguishable
7 from other sections of the park in terms of visitors' expectations of its public forum
8 status"); *Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield*, 203 F.3d 487,
9 494 (7th Cir.), as amended (2000) ("[N]o visual boundaries currently exist that would
10 inform the reasonable but unknowledgeable observer that the Fund property should be
11 distinguished from the public park."). "The recognition that certain government-owned
12 property is a public forum provides open notice to citizens that their freedoms may be
13 exercised there without fear of a censorial government, adding tangible reinforcement
14 to the idea that we are a free people." *Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.*
15 *Lee*, 505 U.S. 672, 696, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

16 **V.**
17 **BLM MANAGED LANDS ARE TRADITIONALLY PUBLIC FORA. THE DEPT. OF**
18 **INTERIOR AND BLM DO NOT HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN LIMITING**
19 **PLAINTIFF, A JOURNALIST, FROM OBSERVING AND REPORTING THE**
20 **DEFENDANTS' ACTIVITIES WHEN "MANAGING" PUBLIC RESOURCES**

21 The Defendants admittedly make the following comment (one of many) found on
22 their official website (as of October 11, 2010) at

23 <http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/Recreation.html>, as follows:

24 The National System of Public Lands offer more diverse
25 recreational opportunities than are available on the land of any other
26 Federal agency. On more than 245 million acres of public lands, people
27 enjoy countless types of outdoor adventure – participating in activities as
28 widely varied as camping, hunting, fishing, hiking, horseback riding,
boating, whitewater rafting, hang gliding, off-highway vehicle driving,
mountain biking, birding and wildlife viewing, photography, climbing, all

1 types of winter sports, and visiting natural and cultural heritage sites.

2 In an increasingly urbanized West, these recreational opportunities
3 and the landscape settings where they take place are vital to the quality of
4 life enjoyed by residents of western states, as well as national and
5 international visitors.

6 The Silver King HMA is clearly a public forum for First Amendment concerns. To
7 call it otherwise would provide the Defendants with broad discretion to classify at their
8 convenience, any or all of the 48 million acres of BLM lands situated in Nevada (sixty-
9 seven percent of Nevada's land base) as non-public forums for purposes of censoring
10 public awareness of government activities and limiting speech, expression and freedom
11 of the press.

12 The "National System of Public Lands" of America are merely under the
13 stewardship of the Defendants. The Defendants manage such lands in trust for the
14 American public. These lands are publically owned and traditionally, always open and
15 freely accessible to any member of the public.

16 In *American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas*, 333 F.3d 1092
17 (9th Cir. 2003), the court examined requirements of "public fora" in the context of a
18 publicly owned pedestrian mall (the Fremont Street Experience) situated squarely in the
19 middle of downtown Las Vegas. The court examined city ordinances restricting
20 leafleting and vending message-bearing materials in the mall, concluding as follows:

21 [w]e hold that the Fremont Street Experience is a public forum. As a
22 consequence, the restrictions on First Amendment activities must be
23 scrutinized under a strict standard of review in order to protect adequately
24 the right to expression.

25 *Id.*, 333 F. 3d at 1094.

26 The *Las Vegas* opinion started with the following notion:

27 "[t]he First Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the
28 principle that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and

1 wide-open.’ ” *Boos v. Barry*, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99
2 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (quoting *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S.
3 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). Although governmental
4 attempts to control speech are far from novel, they have new potency in
5 light of societal changes and trends toward privatization. See *Chicago*
6 *Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth.*, 150 F.3d 695, 704 (7th
7 Cir.1998) (expressing concern regarding “what is now a nationwide trend
8 toward the privatization of public property”).

9 *Id.*, 333 F. 3d at 1097

10 The court relied on Supreme Court statements that,

11 “[a]s society becomes more insular in character, it becomes essential to
12 protect public places where traditional modes of speech and forms of
13 expression can take place.” *United States v. Kokinda*, 497 U.S. 720, 737,
14 110 S.Ct. 3115 , 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
15 judgment).

16 *Id.*, 333 F. 3d at 1097

17 The court recognized there is controversy among courts on what constitutes “public
18 fora” for First Amendment concerns although it outlines that on which most all courts
19 agree.

20 First, and most significantly, there is a common concern for the compatibility of
21 the uses of the forum with expressive activity.

22 As the Supreme Court has stated, “The crucial question is whether the
23 manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of
24 a particular place at a particular time.” *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408
25 U.S. 104, 116, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); see also *Hale*, 806
26 F.2d at 915-16 (holding that where land “has been withdrawn from public
27 use for the purpose of conducting nuclear testing, [i]ts use for expressive,
28 as well as nonexpressive, activity by the public is limited”); *Warren v.*

1 properties. See, e.g., *Venetian Casino Resort*, 257 F.3d at 944, *Jacobsen v.*
2 *Bonine*, 123 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir.1997).

3 *Id.*, 333 F. 3d at 1100-1101

4 The first factor: The area of the Silver King HMA is in essence, vast desert
5 rangeland, as is the remaining lands surrounding it. It is touted as an area of
6 recreation, where the public can, among other uses, view wildlife. This is traditional
7 public fora, much like a city park only much more so when incorporated in vast regions
8 of remote Nevada.

9 The second factor: Once again, the area of the Silver King HMA is in essence,
10 vast desert rangeland, as is the remaining lands surrounding it. There is nothing in the
11 area there that marks the entry into a non-public forum. Nothing there would alter one's
12 expectations that he/she is now leaving a public forum and, when crossing into the
13 Silver King HMA, enters a designated *non-public* forum area.

14 The third factor: The traditional, historic use of the area and its surrounding
15 lands, has been as is stated in the BLM's own website, as follows:

16 On more than 245 million acres of public lands, people enjoy countless
17 types of outdoor adventure – participating in activities as widely varied as
18 camping, hunting, fishing, hiking, horseback riding, boating, whitewater
19 rafting, hang gliding, off-highway vehicle driving, mountain biking, birding
20 and wildlife viewing, photography, climbing, all types of winter sports, and
21 visiting natural and cultural heritage sites.

22 In an increasingly urbanized West, these recreational opportunities
23 and the landscape settings where they take place are vital to the quality of
24 life enjoyed by residents of western states, as well as national and
25 international visitors.

26 It is an area where citizens can escape and recreate in a multitude of activities,
27 to the discretion of its users, the public. This is its historic use. Prior to that, it was
28 used by all as land on which to survive during the settling of the West. Prior to that it

1 was used presumably as hunting grounds and for other uses by native Americans.

2 If a city park or a shopping mall is inherently “public fora,” how do remote regions
3 of “public lands” become or transform into anything else? Isn’t this vast remote region
4 considered perpetual public fora?

5 Considering all these factors Plaintiff submits national public lands comprise
6 public forums. The public lands are freely and openly accessible to all members of the
7 public at all times of day.

8 Constitutionally protected First Amendment activity includes gathering
9 information. It includes observing government activity where the government is
10 involved in matters of significant public interest. Protected also is one’s right to report
11 those observations along with the reporter’s thoughts and/or opinions, to the public. By
12 offering public viewing days of roundups, albeit unduly restrictive, the Defendants
13 nevertheless acknowledge the importance of allowing public access to the Defendants’
14 management activities involving their management of wild horses.

15 For the foregoing reasons the public lands are a public forum for free
16 speech/press purposes.

17

18 **VI.**
19 **THE DEFENDANTS’ RESTRICTIONS REMAIN CONTRARY TO**
20 **FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS**

21 “[t]he government does not have a free hand to regulate private speech on
22 government property.” *Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum*, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.
23 Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).

24 Where government is allowed to regulate public activity on public lands, it cannot
25 make its regulation “content-based.” A regulation is “content-based” if either the
26 underlying purpose of the regulation is to suppress particular ideas, see *Ward v. Rock*
27 *Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989), or if the regulation, by its
28 very terms, singles out particular content for differential treatment. See *Turner Broad.*
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445(1994); see also *City of*

1 *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U.S. 410, 4299 113 S.Ct. 1505 (1993);
2 *Accord, Berger v. City of Seattle*, 569 F. 3d 1029,1051 (9th Cir. 2009).

3 The restrictions placed on the Plaintiff culminate from her prior observation and
4 reporting of how the government Defendants roundup and handle wild horses. Here,
5 Plaintiff's prior photojournalistic reporting of the BLM's activities when rounding up wild
6 horses, caused her to be removed from reasonable access to the Defendants' roundup
7 activities that she enjoyed previously. She is in essence, being punished and precluded
8 from further reporting. (See and compare, generally, exhibits supporting this Motion).
9 The Defendants, not happy with her reporting, chose to regulate and censor her from
10 their activities and thus, they are restricting her with informal, unwritten, "content-based"
11 decisions or policies.

12 Government regulation of speech within non-public forums must comport to
13 reasonable time, place and manner constraints. To pass constitutional muster, a time,
14 place, or manner restriction must meet three criteria:

15 (1) it must be content-neutral; (2) it must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
16 significant governmental interest"; and (3) it must "leave open ample
17 alternative channels for communication of the information."

18 *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (1989) (citation
19 omitted).

20 *First Criterium*

21 The first criterium re content-neutral, is addressed both above and below.

22 *Second Criterium*

23 The second criterium (re the regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve a
24 significant government interest") has no basis or support under these facts.

25 The Defendants claim they kept back the public and plaintiff from trap sites and
26 other locales for "safety" concerns, either for the Plaintiff's safety, or for the safety of the
27 public, or for the safety of the horses. Contrary to these contentions, the Defendants
28 had allowed her into trap areas previously, until she published her photos and video of

1 what had transpired before her eyes, at these trap sites. She was excluded thereafter,
2 from coming close to horse traps during roundup operations. Meanwhile, she did not
3 pose a safety threat or safety issue when she was at trap sites previously. In fact, no
4 one has yet to claim that Ms. Leigh's presence at traps previously interfered with
5 ongoing activities or caused safety issues.

6 Moreover, the Defendants have allowed others (to her exclusion) the opportunity
7 to come close, right up to the horse traps, during roundup activities. If the Defendants
8 can allow someone else (non-essential, non-government employees) to the traps during
9 actual roundup activities but not her, how do they distinguish "safety concerns" for them
10 versus *her*, which causes differences in how she, versus others, are allowed or not
11 allowed the same "access"? The Defendants have yet to adequately define this
12 distinction. They have yet to distinguish varying "safety concerns" that justify disparate
13 "access" of one person over another. (See Declarations of Laura Leigh and others).

14 Failing also is that the Defendants have provided no concrete sight or distance
15 limitations. It varies, all of which precludes Plaintiff from gaining reasonable
16 observation of the Defendants' activities during roundups.

17 Even if a certain limitation on distance were offered, it still may not pass
18 constitutional muster. For example, in *Bay Area Peace Navy v. U.S.*, 914 F.2d 1224
19 (9th Cir. 1990) the court held the Navy did not provide sufficient justification for a 75-yard
20 "security zone" which it established around a viewing pier and Naval vessels during the
21 military exhibition known as "Fleet Week," where during its naval parade,
22 demonstrators sought to present their political views from their own boats, during the
23 naval parade.

24 Because the government has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
25 that the 75-yard security zone is a reasonable time, place and manner
26 restriction, we hold that the zone is a violation of the First Amendment
27 rights of persons desiring to demonstrate in boats off the Aquatic Park
28 Pier during Fleet Week.

1 *Id.*, 914 F. 2d at 1225

2 The court in *Bay Area Peace Navy* found a significant government interest in
3 protecting the public and naval officials from “attacks” from unfriendly forces, but found
4 no tangible evidence that the 75 yard security zone was necessary to protect officials
5 during the “Fleet Week” ceremonies.

6 Although the government's interest in marine safety is significant, there is
7 no tangible evidence that a 75 yard security zone is necessary to protect
8 that interest. ***In prior years, the Coast Guard has demonstrated ample***
9 ***ability to operate safely without a 75 yard security zone.***

10 *Id.*, 914 F. 2d at 1227 (Emphasis)

11 Similarly here, the Plaintiff in the past had been allowed access close to the
12 traps when gathers were ongoing. Defendants offer no explanation for the disparate
13 treatment currently, occurring after she published her observations gleaned from the
14 trap sites.

15 Others, to the exclusion of Plaintiff, who remain non-essential to the
16 government's roundup operations, are allowed at the wild horse traps during the
17 operation. Defendants offer no regulatory explanation for the disparate treatment, or
18 for the selection of favored guests to the trap sites.

19 Clearly, there is but one glaring reason standing out that causes the Plaintiff to
20 be far removed from viewing the Defendants' activities at traps during roundup activities
21 and to other operations involving the removal and ultimate disposition of Silver King wild
22 horses. It is this: The subjects of her journalism and reporting are not popular with
23 them.

24 Plaintiff submits the result of her preclusion to access amounts to an
25 impermissible, unconstitutional content-based censorship, contrary to First Amendment
26 notions. Plaintiff submits the Defendants have not met their burden in demonstrating
27 clearly, rationale behind the Plaintiffs' exclusion; and that the same are not justified in
28 view of the resultant prior restraint of her First Amendment constitutional freedoms.

1 It compares “access” at BLM’s Calico roundup earlier this year. These exhibits as a
2 whole, contradict the Defendants’ Opposition when suggesting the Plaintiff’s access
3 was somehow ample, or sufficient, or reasonable at Silver King. It was not reasonable
4 or sufficient, clearly demonstrated by these exhibits.

5 Ms. Leigh’s Declaration (Exhibit 14) also addresses and contradicts Ms.
6 Emmons Declaration relative to the disparity in her “access” to the Defendants’ roundup
7 activities in Silver King versus what occurred in Calico.

8 Ms. Leigh’s Declaration confirms the disparity in her treatment as a journalist for
9 Horseback Magazine versus how the press would be handled should the New York
10 Times appear on scene. The Defendants admit the press and perhaps Plaintiff as well,
11 would be treated differently if the New York Times appeared on scene versus if they
12 were not on scene. This admission confirms the Defendants continue to treat Plaintiff’s
13 press credentials and the Plaintiff differently from how the Defendants treat other
14 members of the press, particularly those press organizations having more of a national
15 prominence in circulation than that of Horseback Magazine, or who may be more
16 friendly to the Defendants in their reporting of the Defendants’ activities than might the
17 Plaintiff’s reporting.

18 **VIII.**
19 **ARGUABLY SOME MATTERS HAVE BEEN DECIDED AND “COLLATERAL**
20 **ESTOPPEL” COMES INTO PLAY**

21 Defendants fail to address the concept of collateral estoppel. This very court
22 stated the following:

23 As to Leigh’s First Amendment challenge to the
24 closure of public lands during the gather, the court shall
25 grant Leigh’s temporary restraining order. Leigh argues that
26 a blanket closure of 27,000 acres of public land on which the
27 Tuscarora Gather is going to take place is a prior restraint on
28 her First Amendment rights because she will be unable to
observe and report on the health of the horses and the

1 BLM’s management of the gather. The court agrees and
2 finds that she has made a sufficient showing of probable
3 success on the merits to warrant granting the motion. As
4 such, the court enjoins the blanket closure of public land
5 access during the gather and shall lift the closure as written
6 with regard to land access.

7 The court is cognizant of the public interest in this
8 matter and of the right of the public and press to have
9 reasonable access to the gather under the First
10 Amendment. . . .

11 *Leigh v. Salazar*, 2010 WL 2834889 (D. Nev. Jul. 16, 2010)
12 (Published Slip Opinion)

13 This decision involves the identical parties and identical conduct, only at a
14 different location. That prior Order, although addressing a blanket closure of public
15 lands, decided other issues as well that are identical in this case.

16 For instance, for the court to have ruled in favor of the Plaintiff in the prior
17 companion case, it had to have determined (1) that she would be irreparably harmed
18 without the granting of the TRO; (2) that she had standing to raise the constitutional
19 challenge; (3) that she would likely prevail on the merits of the ultimate matter.

20 The court in open session discussed the Plaintiff’s worthiness as a journalist and
21 as a wild horse advocate. There are no less character or professional elements here
22 as there were when the court ruled July 16, 2010 in the companion matter. The court
23 would not have ruled in her favor in the prior case if there were notions that she did not
24 have standing.

25 The court in the companion matter concluded also that this same Plaintiff would
26 be irreparably harmed, **“because she will be unable to observe and report on the**
27 **health of the horses and the BLM’s management of the gather.”** *Leigh v. Salazar*,
28 2010 WL 2834889 (D. Nev. Jul. 16, 2010)(Emphasis). This is the very issue occurring

1 in the instant matter. It all amounts to access. The Defendants deprived access to
2 Plaintiff in the prior case. The Defendants are depriving Plaintiff access in this case,
3 albeit in a different manner. The Defendants in this case are effectively depriving the
4 Plaintiff of her ability to “observe and report on the health of the horses and the BLM’s
5 management of the gather.” *Id.*

6 In the prior case, when Plaintiff was denied access, the court found the Plaintiff
7 was irreparably harmed. In the instant matter, when the Plaintiff is denied access,
8 doesn’t she suffer the same harm?

9 In the prior case when Plaintiff was denied access, the court found, such conduct
10 a prior restraint on her First Amendment rights,” and that she, “made a sufficient
11 showing of probable success on the merits to warrant granting the motion.” *Id.* In the
12 instant case, when the Plaintiff is denied access, doesn’t she demonstrate the same,
13 sufficient showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits?

14 Plaintiff believes these particular issues “issue preclude” the government
15 Defendants from raising these very same issues again. The Defendants should be
16 collaterally estopped on the subject where these very specific issues had already been
17 briefed and litigated through a hearing, as between the same parties which involved
18 another roundup site in Nevada, which involved the same issue – **access** – to,
19 “observe and report on the health of the horses and the BLM’s management of the
20 gather.” *Leigh v. Salazar*, 2010 WL 2834889 (D. Nev. Jul. 16, 2010).

21 Plaintiff incorporates her prior discussions concerning these same subjects
22 where nothing new but mere argument are raised by the Defendants.

23 **IX.**
24 **CONCLUSION**

25 Unlike the activities addressed by the plethora of cases on the subject, the
26 activity being restricted and limited here is one’s right to observe and report government
27 activity. The Silver King HMA is not “Area 51.” It’s not the nuclear test facility. It’s not
28 a top secret government military installation. No state or government secrets are
involved. The activity occurs in remote regions in Nevada. This is not a school house

1 or class room. This is not an airport terminal. No school mail boxes are involved. This
2 is in fact, desert or remote regions in Nevada.

3 No one here seeks to leaflet the area. No one here seeks to make speeches.
4 No one is soliciting business, soliciting to join a religious group, soliciting for any
5 purpose. No one is seeking donations. No one here are street dancers looking for
6 extra change while failing to obtain a permit. No one is seeking handouts at stop signs
7 with cardboard signs. No one is demonstrating. No one is on the “soap box”
8 espousing commercial speech or even political speech.

9 Rather, those being denied access are journalists and members of the public
10 who seek transparency in the manner in which the Dept. of Interior and BLM conduct all
11 aspects of the Silver King wild horse roundup and including their subsequent activities
12 related thereto. Laura Leigh is the journalist in this instance, who has been denied the
13 right to observe government in action. She has been censored in her ability to report
14 what transpires in remote regions of Nevada at the hands of the Defendants. She
15 continues to be irreparably harmed where she is denied the right to observe and then
16 report on government activity.

17 The Silver King roundup is nearly complete. The gather is likely “over” in
18 perhaps two days (Wednesday). At least before this time, Plaintiff respectfully requests
19 the court act and cause the Defendants to further suspend all remaining efforts relative
20 to the Silver King wild horse gather until such time as the Defendants provide the
21 Plaintiff true access as is requested in the Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining
22 Order, and until the court is able to hear the pending preliminary injunction.

23 “Prior restraints on speech . . . are the most serious and least tolerable
24 infringement on First Amendment rights.” *Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S.
25 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976). Such restraints bear a “heavy presumption” against
26 their constitutionality. *Forsyth County*, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395.

27 Plaintiff respectfully requests the court grant her the relief requested.

28 Attached and incorporated into Plaintiff’s Reply Brief are the following:

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Declaration of Laura Leigh at **EXHIBIT "14"** attached;

Laura Leigh Photos at **EXHIBIT "15"** attached;

Dated this 12th day of October 2010

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
LAW OFFICE OF GORDON M. COWAN

/S/

Gordon M. Cowan Esq. (SBN 1781)
Attorney for Plaintiff LAURA LEIGH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b) & Local Rules for Electronic Filing]

I certify that on the date indicated below, I filed the foregoing document(s) with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which would provide notification and a copy of same to counsel fo record, including the following counsel:

Erik Petersen, Esq.

erik.peterson@usdoj.gov

DATED this 12th Day of October 2010

/S/

G.M. Cowan